Martha Nussbaum opens her article “Women and Work – the Capabilities Approach” with the examples of two Indian women with very different life experiences. Although the women are from two different castes, both have faced sex discrimination. Nussbaum uses this example to illustrate the need to contemplate the similarities and differences of women’s experiences around the world.
Nussbaum emphasizes the ideas of equal worth, freedom and opportunity. She argues that these ideas are frequently violated on the grounds of sex. According to Nussbaum, laws often perpetuate and codify inequalities such as unequal access to basic nutrition, health care, employment and education. She argues that a normative framework for addressing these issues across cultural boundaries is necessary. Nussbaum prefers her own modified capabilities approach.
Nussbaum rejects three common arguments against the need for this cross-cultural framework. The first argument - the argument from culture - states that traditional cultures have their own norms and claims that feminist norms appear “Western.” Nussbaum argues that this notion of “tradition” is too simple, and that the concepts of choice and economic agency are not solely Western values.
The second argument Nussbaum refutes is called the argument from the good of diversity. This argument claims that diversity requires the world not to agree on a single set of norms. Nussbaum points out that cultural diversity is not similar to linguistic diversity – cultural practices may be harmful, while language practices generally are not. She believes we need to determine which cultural practices are worth preserving because they do not cause harm.
The third contested argument is the argument from paternalism. This argument states that cross-cultural norms show too little respect for people’s choice and treats them like children instead of rational adults. Nussbaum argues that liberties – such as religious tolerance and associative freedom – are themselves cross-cultural norms. She also points out that many existing value systems are paternalistic towards women. She argues the necessity of considering the distribution of resources and opportunity to each and every person.
Nussbaum then introduces an alternative to the capabilities approach. This resource-based alternative utilizes GNP per capita as its main analytical tool. Nussbaum objects to this approach on the basis that it does not incorporate the distribution of wealth and income. She claims that specific areas of women’s lives - such as life expectancy, infant mortality and political liberties - ought to be considered in any analysis.
Another alternative introduced by Nussbaum is the preference-based approach. Nussbaum rejects this approach because preferences are not separate from economic and social conditions. Many preferences are learned rather than inherent. Furthermore, Nussbaum believes that preferences are often created by social patterns of male privilege and female subordination. She claims a preference-based approach will only reinforce inequalities and injustice.
According to Nussbaum, the capabilities approach incorporates a quality of life assessment. It is primarily concerned with how resources enable a woman to function. The core idea of this approach is that each woman is a dignified and free being with the ability to shape her own life. The goal of this approach is a society in which individuals are treated as worthy of regard.
Nussbaum lists the human functional capabilities that she claims are central to this approach: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; consideration for other species; play; and control over one’s environment. According to Nussbaum, all of these factors of well being are central in importance and distinct in quality. However, practical reason and affiliation are the two she feels are most important.
Nussbaum explains that there exist three different types of capabilities. Inherent “basic capabilities” are the basis for more advanced capabilities. Internal capabilities incorporate the state of the person that allows for the “exercise of functions.” Together, these two capabilities comprise what Nussbaum calls “combined capabilities.” She states that her list of functional capabilities is made up of combined capabilities.
According to Nussbaum, capabilities and human rights are closely related. She believes that the best way to think about rights is to view them as combined capabilities, because capabilities are not as linked to cultural and historical tradition as the concept of rights. Nussbaum says that in some cases, the language of rights should be used to preserve a sense of agreement.
Nussbaum then reiterates her central claim that cross-cultural norms are required and that these norms should be formulated as a set of capabilities. In conclusion, she returns to the example of the two Indian women she introduced at the beginning of her article. She uses the stories of these women to illustrate the fact that women across the world lack support for Nussbaum’s “central human functions” and that this failure is a problem of justice. According to Nussbaum, solving this problem requires a cross-cultural conception of human capabilities.
